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GOOD GOVERNANCE: LESSONS FOR SPORTS ORGANI-
ZATIONS? 
Prof Lukas Handschin, University of Base.l 
A. THE APPLICABILITY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
PRINCIPLES TO SPORTS ASSOCIA TIONS 
1. Basics 
In recent years, detailed corporate governance principles have risen to prominence in 
commercial companies, as well as in sport associations.1 This development applies 
mainly to internal decision making processes of enterprises. New rules were intro-
duced, including regulations on conflict of interest, on the composition of the execu-
tive board and on how to ensure that the shareholders' rights are respected.2 
Furthermore, anti-corruption compliance structures have been developed and intro-
duced over the last few years trying to ensure that commercial companies do not bribe 
to pursue their business interests.3 Criminal law has abetted this development mainly 
HEINI/PORTMANN/SEEMANN, Grundriss des Vereinsrechts (Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, 
2009), 109; see, eg the Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance (in force since mid 
2002). 
DRUEY/GLANZMANN, Gesellschafts- und Handelsrecht (Zurich, Schulthess, 2010), 203-5; MEIER-
HAYOZ/FORSTMOSER, Schweizerisches Gesellschaftsrecht (Bern, Stämpfli Verlag AG, 11 th edn, 
2012), 320 et seqq. 
DRUEY/GLANZMANN, supra n 2, 384-85; MEIER-HAYOZ/FORSTMOSER, supra n 2, 564; PIETH, Anti-
Korruptions-Compliance (Zurich/St Gallen, Dike Verlag AG, 2011), 2 et seqq. 
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with regulations declaring eompanies and their exeeutive board as ehargeable, in ease 
a third party is bribed by the eompany. 
Sports associations ean be eeonomic enterprises4, whieh may realize turnovers and 
operative profits that ean be eompared to eorporations. Given their eeonomie situa-
tion, it appears reasonable to apply the eorporate governanee and the eomplianee 
principles also on sports organizations. This is basically eorreet: However, two differ-
enees between sports associations and eommercial eompanies have to be eonsidered. 
Firstly, eommercial eompanies are based on ineffeetive _shareholders, whereas demo-
eratie struetures are used in association law. Seeondly, the association's 'down to top' 
strueture differs from the 'top to down' struetures whieh apply to eorporations. Be-
eause of these distinetions, eorporate governanee-principles for eommercial enterpris-
es eannot be adopted on a one-to-one basis for sports organizations. 
2. Democratic structures vs. ineffective shareholders 
Most large listed eommercial eompanies have a fragmented body of shareholders, 
with no dominant shareholder. The 'parity-rule' of the Swiss eode of obligations as-
signs all strategie and operative management funetions mandatory to the board of 
direetors and the management.5 The assembly of shareholders has praetically no 
means to influenee the strategic and management behavior of the eompany. In partie-
ular, the assembly eannot make any strategie deeisions, nor ean it eomment on fun-
damental business decisions. The voting-out of board members is the general assem-
bly' s primary instrument to 'influenee' business decisions. 6 
4 HEINI/PORTMANN/SEEMANN, supra n 1, 10. 
Switzerland: OR Art. 716a; DRUEY/GLANZMANN, supra 2, 173-74; DUBS/TRUFFER, in 
HONSELL/VOGT/WATTER (eds.), Basler Kommentar, Obligationenrecht II, Art. 530-964 OR, Art. 
1-6 SchlT AG, Art. 1-11 Übest GmbH (Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 4th edn, 2012), Art. 698 N 8; 
MEIER-HAYOZ/FORSTMOSER, supra n 2, 519, 535-36; WATTER/ROTH PELLANDA, in 
HONSELL/VOGT/WATTER (eds.), Basler Kommentar, Obligationenrecht II, Art. 530-964 OR, Art. 
1-6 SchlT AG, Art. 1-11 Übest GmbH (Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 4th edn, 2012), Art. 716a N 4 
etseqq. 
Switzerland: OR Art. 705; ZGB Art. 65; BöCKLI, Schweizer Aktienrecht (Zurich, Schulthess, 4th 
edn., 2009), 1342, 1564; HEINI/SCHERRER, in HONSELL/VOGT/GEISER (eds.), Basler Kommentar, 
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Further, it has to be noted that the management may want to influenee the nomina-
tion proeedure for future board members by eleeting board members deemed to be 
loyal to the management who helped to ehoose them. This may impair the ability of 
the board to eontrol the management. For this reason eorporate governanee principles 
require the inclusion of specifie audit and nomination eommittees, the inclusion of 
outside members, and the disclosure of their remuneration.7 
The risk of the management eontrolling the board is mueh smaller in sports associa-
tions than in eommercial eompanies. The member associations of a sports association, 
whieh eontrol the general assembly, have more power than the shareholders of a 
eommercial eompany. The parity rule does not apply for associations8, thus enabling 
the general assembly to exert signifieantly more influenee on the strategy and even on 
the management of the association. 9 In theory, the general assembly has the power to 
attraet all eompetenees from the board, whether direetly or through a modifieation of 
the bylaws10• Therefore, nomination, eompensation and audit eommittees, traditional-
ly reeommended for eommercial enterprises, are often not needed if members of 
sports associations make use of their rights. To ensure this, it is paramount that the 
associations-related meehanisms work, and are applied eorreetly.11 
Summarizing, good governanee in sports associations starts with a strict adherenee to 
formal rules on the decision making proeess. The importanee of these rules is also 
Zivilgesetzbuch 1, Art. 1-456 ZGB (Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 4th edn., 2010), Art. 65 N 1 et 
seqq. 
See sec. 12 et seq., 22 und 26 Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance; BöCKLI, 
supra n 6, 1993 et seqq., 2002-3, 2005-6. 
. Switzerland: ZGB Art. 64 par. 1; HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 64 N 16 et seqq. 
Switzerland: ZGB Art. 65; HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 65 N 1 et seqq.; MEIER-
HAYOZ/FORSTMOSER, supra n 2, 682-83. 
10 HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 65 N 1; RIEMER, Berner Kommentar, Bd. 1/3/2: Die Vereine, 
Systematischer Teil und Kommentar zu Art. 60-79 ZGB (Bern, Stämpfli Verlag AG, 1990), Vor-
bern. zu Art. 64-69 N 21. 
11 See PACHMANN, Sportverbände und Corporate Governance, dissertation (Zurich, Dike Verlag, 
2007), 178. 
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shown by the fact that resolutions, which ignore these rules, are null and void12, which 
rneans that their nullity can be brought up at any time. 
3. 'Top to down'-structure and 'down-to-top'-structure 
Another difference between cornrnercial cornpanies and sports associations can be 
seen in the corporate structure. Cornrnercial corporations are organized frorn top to 
down. They are often lead by a holding cornpany, which has control over the general 
assembly as well as over the subsidiary' s rnanagernent.13 
Further, the consolidated financial reports include all entities, which belong to the 
company group.14 All financial situations are known by the holding company.15 Thus, 
the financial controls reach down to each subsidiary of the group. 
Sports associations are organized the other way around - 'down to top', not 'top to 
down'. lt all begins with the sports club that is a rnernber of a national sports associa-
tion, which in turn is a rnember of the international sports association. Mernber asso-
ciations are independent16 and are not included in a consolidated balance sheet. The 
international sports association has no institutional financial control on their rnernber 
associations. In sorne specific areas the mernber organizations are certainly influenced 
by the international sports association, 17 however, the general assernbly is not affect-
ed. 
For sports organizations, it is rnore difficult to apply specific standards within the 
sport association and its rnernbers. Their structural influence on the rnernber associa-
12 Switzerland: ZGB Art. 75; HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 75 N 1 et seqq.; RIEMER, supra n 10, 
Art 75 N 1 et seqq. 
13 HANDSCHIN, Der Konzern im geltenden schweizerischen Privatrecht, habil. (Basel/Zurich, 
Schulthess; 1994 ), 42 et seqq. 
14 Switzerland OR Art 663e respectively OR Art. 963; HANDSCHIN, Rechnungslegung im Gesell-
schaftsrecht (Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2013), 433 et seqq. 
15 HANDSCHIN, supra n 14, 427, 430. 
l6 HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 64 N 10 et seqq. 
11 See, eg UEF A Financial Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations. 
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tions is very lirnited rnainly because of the rnissing influence on their general assern-
blies. Cornrnercial corporate groups can rnore easily exercise their influence upon 
subsidiaries than sports organizations. This can be illustrated with the fight against 
doping. To irnplernent an anti-doping policy it was not enough to declare frorn top to 
down that such a behavior is not tolerated. An international organization had to be 
set up and be given the respective cornpetences.18 
4. Preliminary conclusion 
These two exarnples show that it is imperrnissible to slavishly apply corporate govern-
ance rules and cornpliance systems, which were developed for cornrnercial corpora-
tions to international sports associations. The applicability of cornrnercial corporate 
governance rules to sports associations has to be looked-at for each issue individually. 
Corporate governance rules and compliance systerns for sports associations have to be 
developed based on the law for associations. 
B. ANTl-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE 
1. Basics 
There is a broad consensus that corruption is inadrnissible and that corporate struc-
tures should be organized in such a way that would reduce the risk of corruption.19 
Two different risks have .to be considered when talking about corruption-risks. First, 
the corporate structures have to ensure that the corporation itself does not bribe. 
Secondly, the corporate structures have to ensure that outside parties do not bribe 
specific influential persons within a sports association20, and influence the decision 
rnaking process. 
rn The WorldAnti-DopingAgency (WADA) was established on November 10, 1999. 
19 PIETH, supra n 3, 9 et seqq. 
20 Switzerland: UWG Art. 4a. 
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In the commercial area the main risk is the first. In the past such practices were 
standard within many companies. In some countries bribery payments were even 
allowable expenses for tax purposes.21 This specific risk is the dominant corruption 
risk within commercial enterprises. However, it is atypical for sports associations, 
because there is a low risk that sports associations are bribing foreign officials. There-
fore, Anti-corruption compliance, which has been developed for commercial compa-
nies, cannot be transferred and applied to sports associations one-to-one. 
The alleged cases of corruption within sports associations refer not to active bribery, 
but to passive bribery. The bribery-risk of sports associations is that outside parties 
bribe specific influential persons within a sports association to exercise an undue 
influence on the decision making process. This affects internal processes, including 
e.g. the election of the president, the decision on the venue of championships, the , 
decision regarding commercial agreements, etc. 
Governance regulations for sports associations, therefore, have to tie in with their 
internal decision making process. Certain legislations exist, which could limit the risk 
of undue influence if correctly and consistently applied. Furthermore, statutory rules 
can minimize the aforementioned risk. 
2. The democratic principle of association law 
In sports associations the principles of good corporate governance and anti-
corruption compliance address the same issues. The correct decision-making within 
the association is not only required by association law, but is also an important tool of 
anti-corruption compliance. The 'core-rules' regarding the correct decision-making in 
the Swiss Civil Codeare Art. 67 par. 2 CC, "Resolutions require a majority of the votes 
ofthe members present", and the notice rules foreseen in Art. 67 par. 3 CC.22 
21 Switzerland: In accordance with DBG Art. 58 par. 2 this is forbidden since 1 January 2001. 
22 EGGER, Zürcher Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch, Einleitung, Art. 1-10, Das 
Personenrecht, Art 11-89 (Zurich, Schulthess, 2nd ed., 1930), Art. 66/67 N 1 et seqq.; HEI-
NI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 67 N 8 et seqq„ 18 et seqq.; MEIER-HAYOZ/FORSTMOSER, supra n 2, 
677; RIEMER, supra n 10, Art. 67 N 49 et seqq., 73 et seqq. 
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In addition, there are strong references in association law to the principles of democ-
racy.23 The Civil Code refers to it explicitly in Art. 67 par. i CC ("All members have 
equal voting rights at the general assembly"). Furthermore, in i912, when the associa-
tion law was codified as federal law, a democratic environment was already preemi-
nent. For this reason, the rules regarding the taking of resolutions which are applica-
ble for example to town meetings or other public democratic institutions can be ap-
plied to the general assembly by analogy.24 
Procedures within the association must ensure that each member association can 
exercise his participation rights properly. To guarantee this, the participation rights, 
in particular related to the general assembly, have to be respected. lt is argued that 
such procedures should not be overly formalized, since many (small) associations lack 
the professional structures to uphold such a sophisticated procedural organisation. 
But: if the association is able to cope with such procedures, it is inadmissible to allow 
the association to deviate from such rules, only with the "justification", that other 
smaller associations may have already done so. In this case it is: Quod licet bovi non 
licet iovi. 
The standard, which has tobe applied to the decision-making within an association, 
depends on the size and the function of the association and its risks (including the 
corruption risk). If the discussed resolution has an economic impact ( which is also 
true for elections), it is important to make sure, that all rules regarding the decision 
making process are observed. In this respect, procedural rules for the formation of the 
general assembly of commercial companies can be applied.25 This arises from the fact 
that the purpose of such formal rules is exactly the same as the one for sports associa-
tions. 
23 HEINI/PORTMANN/SEEMANN, supra n 1, 98-9; RIEMER, Stämpflis Handkommentar SHK, Vereins-
und Stiftungsrecht (Art. 60-89bis ZGB): mit den Allgemeinen Bestimmungen zu den juristi-
schen Personen (Art. 52-59 ZGB) (Bern, Stämpfli Verlag, 2012), Art 67 N 23, 25. 
24 EGGER, supra n 22, Art 66/67 N 3; see, eg HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 66 N 10. 
2s Switzerland: OR Art 699 et seqq.; HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art 66 N 10; see, eg for the exe-
cution of the general assembly RIEMER, supra n 10, Art 65 N 28 et seqq. 
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3. The composition of the executive committee 
The democratic principle allows two different systems on how to elect the members of 
a committee. When using the majority principle, all members of the committee are 
elected by majority vote. This means, that the members of the association who control 
more than 50% of the votes have the potential to elect all members of the executive 
committee. In contrast, the proportional system leads to a better representation of the 
associations' members. A group of members, that for example controls 20% of all 
members, would be allowed to elect its candidates to th~ executive board proportion-
ally to its size. 
The advantages of the majority rule are that each member of the committee is elected 
by a majority vote, which increases his legitimacy and ensures certain homogeneity 
within the committee. However, this principle includes the risk that a shift of power 
within the association may lead to an exchange of all the members of the committee. 
This can constitute an incentive 'to profit' from their mandate, within their limited 
time of office. The proportional system on the other hand has the advantage that all 
major groups of members are represented in the committee. A better mutual control 
within the committee is the positive result of this proportional representation. 
The temptations of absolute power can best be controlled by avoiding absolute power. 
Hence, the proportional system is a strong tool to reduce the risk of unfaithful deci-
sion-making and corruptive practices within the committee. A representative for-
mation of the committee is a better instrument than the inclusion of outside mem-
bers. Being elected by the inside members, such outsiders are put in a problematic 
loyalty situation from the very beginning. However, most sports associations follow 
the majority rule and include only regional proportional elements. 26 
26 See, eg IOC (International Olympic Committee): Art. 19.2.1 IOC-Statutes: "All members of the 
IOC Executive Board are elected by the Session, in a secret ballot, by a majority of the votes 
cast."; IIHF (International Ice Hockey Federation): Art. 36 IIHF-Statutes: "Elections"; IHF (In-
ternational Handball Federation): Art. 12.5.5 !HF-Statutes: "Elections require an absolute ma-
jority of votes present. [„.]"; FIS (International Ski Federation): Art. 21.2 FIS-Statutes: "The 
Congress normally makes its decisions by a simple majority vote, [ .. ]"; UCI (International Cy-
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4. Assembly of delegates 
Association law allows the establishment of an assembly of delegates27 who are elected 
by the member associations. The assembly of delegates can be compared to a parlia-
ment. The composition of the assembly of delegates usually follows the representative 
method, which leads to a proportional representation of all members of the associa-
tion. 
An assembly of delegates can also exist next to a general assembly, which can still 
keep some competences. Also the complete replacement of the general assembly by 
the delegates' assembly is possible. 28 
An advantage of the assembly of delegates is its small size. 29 Thus, meetings can take 
place more frequently, which allows the assembly of delegates to be made into a su-
pervisory body on a small executive committee. In case of a delegates' assembly com-
posed by the proportional method, the impact of a committee elected by majority vote 
would be less grave. 
5. Delegate decisions to larger bodies 
Undue influences on the decision-making within the association (including the cor-
ruption risk) can be avoided if large bodies are competent for the respective decision, 
and if members may vote secretly. 
cling Union): Art. 39.1 UCI-Constitution; FIFA (International Federation of Association Foot-
ball): Art. 27.4 FIFA-Statutes: "Unless otherwise stipulated in the Statutes, a simple majority is 
sufficient for a vote tobe valid. [ .. .]",Art. 30.3 FIFA-Statutes: "The members of the Executive 
Committee shall be appointed by the respective Confederations, with the exception of the vice-
president representing the four British Associations, who is elected by the latter. [ ... ]". 
27 HEINI/PORTMANN/SEEMANN, supra n 1, 121-23; HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 64 N 29 et seq.; 
MEIER-HAYOZ and FORSTMOSER, supra n 2, 682-83; RIEMER, supra n io, Art. 66 N 33 et seqq. 
28 HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 64 N 29; MEIER-HAYOZ/FORSTMOSER, supra n 2, 682-83; PACH-
MANN, supra 11, 267. 
29 See HEINI/PORTMANN/SEEMANN, supra n 1, 121-2. 
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The smaller the deciding body is, the easier it is to bribe members of such a body in 
view of a specific decision. Where large sums are at hand, the briber will expect con-
trol on his "investment" and, therefore, he will seek to ensure that the bribed official 
votes the way he was paid for. In a small body, it is much easier to influence the deci-
sion-making by bribing a key person. In addition, it is much easier to control if this 
key person has "fulfilled" his promise. Influencing the decisions of large bodies, which 
have a secret voting procedure, is significantly harder. First, the impact of one single 
bribe is reduced due to the large amount of members. Second, it is not possible to 
control the bribed individual. 
Undue influence on large bodies is not so much exercised by bribing their members, 
but by trying to influence the conduct of the meeting ( e.g. by handing out incomplete 
presentation of the information on which members' opinion is built, by ignoring dis-
sident votes, etc.).30 However, these risks can be controlled by the issuance of strict 
procedural rules that will have to be followed. 
6. Nullity or voidability 
If a resolution by the association violates procedural or substantive law, the resolution 
is either "voidable" or "null and void". The difference between "voidable" and "null and 
void" refers to the rule of Art. 75 CC that entitles any member "to legally challenge, 
within a month of the day of which he had notice of it, the decisions which [ . .'.] are 
contrary to law or the statutes of the association." If the resolution is null and void, its 
nullity can be raised at any time, even if the one-month period of Art. 75 CC has 
lapsed.31 
3° For this reason resolutions which violate procedural rules are null and void; see HEI-
NI/PORTMANN/SEEMANN, supra n 1, 74; HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 75 N 36; RIEMER, supra n 
10, Art. 75 N 95 ff. 
31 Switzerland: ZGB Art 75; HEINI/PORTMANN/SEEMANN, supra n 1, 74-5; HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 
6, Art. 75 N 34; RIEMER, supra n 10, Art 75 N 91. 
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A resolution is null and void if it is affiicted with a severe deficiency; both procedural 
and substantive.32 The rules, which assume nullity, also have the function of control-
ling the executive body of the association by creating a strong incentive to adhere to 
these formal rules. Hence, nullity is a sanction and ensures the correct decision-
making within an association. This is important, when the principle of proportionality 
is applied. The principle of proportionality means that a legal consequence must be 
reasonable, considering the competing interests of the other party. Although this is a 
principle of public law, it can also be applied in private law33• Its application to the 
question of nullity would require an analysis of the interests at hand and relating 
them to each other. If, for example, the interests of the claimant are small, but the 
damage which would occur to the association if the alleged resolution was found to be 
null and void would be large, the principle of proportionality would weigh the two 
interests and - and if the interests of the claimant are disproportionate - deny nullity. 
However, all interests must be included in this analysis. Since nullity also serves as a 
sanction for non-compliance with formal rules regarding the taking of resolutions, we 
not only relate the personal interests of the claimant to the damage of the association 
if nullity is assumed, but also the general interest of the law (including the public 
interest that the decision-making within the sports-association is free of corruption) 
that formal rules on resolution-taking should be observed. 
7. Relation to Article R49 of the CAS-Code 
According to Article R49 of the CAS-Code, the deadline to file an appeal shall be 
twenty-one days from the receipt of the decision appealed against". In a recent, prob-
lematic decision34, the CAS has ruled that the Article R49 applies even if the decision 
at stake is null and void. The CAS assumes that the rule whereby nullity can be 
32 See HEINI/PORTMANN/SEEMANN, supra n 1, 7 4-5; HEINI/SCHERRER, supra n 6, Art. 75 N 21; MEIER-
HAYOZ/FORSTMOSER, supra n 2, 678-79; RIEMER, supra n 23, Art. 75 N 21. 
33 HONSELL, in HONSELL/VOGT/GEISER (eds.), Basler Kommentar, Zivilgesetzbuch l, Art. 1-456 ZGB 
(Basel, Helbing Lichtenhahn, 4th edn., 2010), Art. 2 N 21. 
34 CAS 2011/A/2360 and CAS 2011/A/2392, English Chess Federation and Georgian Chess Feder-
ation v. FIDE. 
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claimed at any time is a procedural rule, which has been superseded by the arbitration 
rules. The question remains if the rules on nullity are really procedural and are not 
substantive in nature. The nullity-rules ensure correct decision-making as well and are 
an important element of anti-corruption compliance. 
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